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NOTE 
RETHINKING GENOCIDAL INTENT. THE CASE FOR A 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED INTERPRETATION 
Alexander K A .  Greenawalt 
From its initial codifiation in the 1948 Convention on the Prmention 
and Punishment of Genocide to its most recent inclusion in the Rome Statue 
of the International Criminal Court, the international nnme of genocide has 
been defined as involving an "intent to (ERFtroy, in whole or in part, a na- 
tional, ethnicah racial or religious group, as such." The predominant inter- 
petation of this language views genocide as a nnzme of "speciJicW or 'kpecial" 
intent, in which the perpetrator deliberately s ~ k s  the whole or partial destruc- 
tion of a poteckd group. This Noteplrnues an alternate uppoach. Relying 
on both the histmy of the Genocide Convention and on a substantive critique 
of the speci$c intent intqetation, it argues that, in defined situations, 
principal culpability for genocide should extend to those who may personally 
lack a spectzc genocidal purpose, but who commit genocidal acts while un- 
derstanding the destructive consequences of their actions. 
On December 9, 1948, H.V. Evatt, the Australian President of the 
United Nations General Assembly, announced that "the supremacy of in- 
ternational law had been proclaimed and a significant advance had been 
made in the development of international criminal la.cv."l The event at 
issue ~vas the General Assembly's unanimous adoption of Resolution 
260(A) (111), the International Convention on the Prevention and Punish- 
ment of the Crime of Genocide.* And while the lackluster enforcement 
of international criminal norms during much of the last fifty years may 
suggest that Mr. Evatt spoke too soon, the statement must have seemed 
unassailable at the time. Indeed, the post-World War I1 climate, haunted 
as it was by fresh memories of the Holocaust, produced an as-yet-unprece- 
dented consensus in favor of vigorous international enforcement of 
human rights norms. The chief achievements of that era include the ad 
hoc International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg which tried high Nazi 
officials for ~var  crime^;^ the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East,* which prosecuted Japanese officials; the Universal Declaration of 
1. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 179th plen. mtg. at 852, U.N. Doc. A/PV.179 (1948). 
2. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 
1948, 102 Stat 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, U.N. G A  Res. 260, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 179th 
plen. mtg. at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
3. See generally Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (1992); The 
Nuremberg Trial and International Law (George G i b u r g s  & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 
1990); Ann Tusa & John Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial (1983). 
4. See generally Arnold C. Brackman, The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of 
the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1987); Richard H. Minear, Victors' Justice: The Tokyo War 
Crimes Trial (1971). 
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Human Rights;5 unanimously adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on 
the day after the Genocide Convention; and the institution of the United 
Nations itself, whose Charter pledges the pursuit of international peace 
and the respect of human rights.6 
The Genocide Convention occupies a prominent place among these 
post-war efforts. Identifying genocide as an "odious scourge" that "has 
inflicted great losses on humanity,"' it intrudes into historically-protected 
areas of state sovereignty by proclaiming genocide a "crime under inter- 
national law" that states must "undertake to prevent and to p~n ish . "~  
Transcending the state-focused nature of international la1vY9 moreover, it 
assigns an individual responsibility that is unmitigated by any state action 
requirement or head-of-state immunity. As Article IV of the Convention 
maintains, " [plersons committing genocide or any of the other acts enu- 
merated in Article I11 shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally 
responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals."1° And unlike 
the Nuremberg Charter, which restricted its jurisdiction to crimes com- 
mitted in connection with Germany's war of aggression,ll the Genocide 
Convention establishes genocide as a crime under international law 
"whether committed in time of peace or in time of 1var."12 
But despite the bold language of the Convention, the post-1948 his- 
tory has been mixed at best. On the level of legal development, the pro- 
5. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
6. See U.N. Charter. The Preamble expresses the determination of W e  the Peoples 
of the United Nations . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large 
and small." Article One also states that a purpose of the Charter is "to achieve 
international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion." U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3. 
7. ~ e n o c i d ~ ~ o n v e n t i o n ,  supra note 2, a t  preamble. 
8. Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1. As Professor Louis Henkin has 
written, "Historically, how a state treated persons within its territory was its own affair, 
implicit in its sovereignty over its own territory and in the freedom to act there as it would 
unless specifically forbidden by international law. . . . Real, full-blown internationalization 
of human rights came in the wake of Hitler and World War 11." Louis Henkin, The 
Internationalization of Human Rights, Proc. of the Gen. Educ. Seminar, (Colum. U.), Fall 
1977, at 7-9. 
9. See, e-g., Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics Values and Functions, 216 
Recueil des Cours 22 (1989-IV) ("The purposes of international law, like those of domestic 
law, are to establish and maintain order and enhance reliable expectations, to protect 
'persons', their property and other interests, to further other values, But the cons&ency 
of the international society is different. The 'persons' constituting international society are 
not individual human beings but political entities, 'States', and the society is an inter-State 
system, a system of States."). 
10. Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at art. 4. 
11. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of 
the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6(c), 
Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, art. 6. [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. 
12. Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1. 
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hibition against genocide has become more and more entrenched in in- 
ternational law. As of 1999, a total of 127 states, including the United 
States, have ratified the Convention.13 Perhaps more important, the pro- 
hibition against genocide is now widely recognized as expressing a per- 
emptory norm of international law from which no state may derogate, 
even absent a conventional obligation.14 
As regards enforcement, however, the international community has 
only recently begun to make efforts to bring perpetrators of genocide to 
justice. For most of the last five decades, as credible reports of genocide 
in places such as Cambodia15 and Iraq16 have failed to catalyze either 
prevention or punishment, the Convention has served primarily as a sym- 
bolic reminder of the international community's promises. Still, as ob- 
servers of the last few years well know, the situation appears to be chang- 
ing. In 1993 and 1994, the U.N. Security Council exercised its 
enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter1' to establish 
ad hoc international criminal tribunals charged with investigating and 
prosecuting violations of international criminal law committed in the for- 
mer Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively.ls The statutes of both the 
United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla- 
13. U.S. State Dep't, Treaties in Force 377-78 (1999). The road to ratification by the 
U.S. was a particularly controversial process. After years of delay, the U.S. finally ratified, 
with multiple reservations and understandings, in 1986. See Lawrence J. LeBlanc, The 
United States and the Genocide Convention (1991). 
14. The International Court ofJustice proclaimed thii principle in Reservations to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 
23 (May 28). See also Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. 
(Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5). Some have claimed that the customary 
definition of genocide is broader than that provided by the Convention. See, e.g., Beth 
Van Schaack, Note, The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide 
Convention's Bliid Spot, 106 Yale LJ. 2259 (1997) (arguing that the prohibition against 
genocide extends to the destruction of political groups). But this view has not been 
broadly embraced. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its 
Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 5lst Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 87, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 
(1996) [hereinafter ILC Report] ("The definition of genocide contained in article I1 of the 
Convention . . . is widely accepted and generally recognized as the authoritative definition 
of this crime . . . ."). This and all subsequent references to the 1996 L C  Report refer to 
Chapter 11, the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind and 
commentary. 
15. See generally Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in 
Cambodia Under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79 (1996). 
16. See generally George Black, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the 
Kurds (1993). 
17. U.N. Charter a r t  39 ("The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore 
international peace and security."). 
18. See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 
(1993) (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia); S.C. 
Res., U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (establishing the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda). 
Heinonline - -  99 Colum. L. Rev. 2261 1999 
2262 COLUMBLA LAW REVLEW Wol. 99:2259 
via (ICTY) and the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) tribunals establish subject-matter jurisdiction over acts of 
genocide, with the crime's definition reproduced verbatim from Article 11 
of the Genocide Convention.lg The ad hoc tribunals have since issued 
several indictments alleging acts of genocideFO and in the last two years 
the ICTR has produced four genocide  conviction^,^' the first such convic- 
tions ever reached by an international body. In addition, with the adop 
tion in July 1998 of the so-called Rome Statute of the future International 
Criminal Court (ICC), the international community has made the first 
and crucial step towards erecting a standing international body capable 
of prosecuting future perpetrators of genocide.22 
This recent transformation of the prohibition against genocide from 
a largely symbolic reminder of the horrors of World War 11 into an ap- 
19. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704, Annex, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192 
(1994) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Tenitoxy of Rwanda and 
R~vandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the 
Territory of Neighbouring States, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d mtg. at 3., U.N. Doc. S/ 
RES/955, Annex (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1602 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR 
Statute]. 
20. Copies of public ICTY indictments are available at <http://wtvw.un.org/icty/ 
BLS/ind.htm> (visited Nov. 4, 1999). A summary of ICTR cases is available at the ICTR 
website avcnv.ictr.or@ (visited Nov. 4, 1999). 
21. The first conviction, in The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Judgement and 
Sentence, ICTR-97-234 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial Chamber) &ttp://~vww.ictr.org/> 
(visited Nov. 4,1999), followed a guilty plea. The landmarkjudgment in The Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-9WT, Judgement, (Int'l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial 
Chamber I, Sept. 2, 1998) <http://~mvw.ictr.org/> (visited Nov. 4, 1999) [hereinafter 
Akayesu Judgment], follo~ved a full trial. Most recently, the ICTR convicted Clement 
Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana of genocide. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. 
ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, (Int'l Crim. Trib. Rrvanda, Trial Chamber 11, May 21, 1999) 
<http://~cnvwYWictr.org/> (visited Nov. 4, 1999) [hereinafter Kayishema Judgment]. 
Although the judgment ~vas announced on May 21, the text of the decision ~vas not made 
public until October of 1999, as this Note entered publication. 
22. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9 (1998) <http://wtvw.un.org/icc/partl.htm> (visited Nov. 4, 1999) 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. The treaty-based statute provides for a permanent 
international criminal court to assertjurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and \var crimes. Id. art. 5(1). Adopted by a vote of 120 states in favor, 7 against, and 21 
abstentions, see Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 93 Am. J. Int'l. L. 22,22 (1999), the treaty will enter into force once 60 states have 
ratified i t  See Rome Statute, a r t  126. Among the few states opposing the statute was the 
United States, who favored more limitations on the tribunal's jurisdiction than the treaty 
provides. For a statement of the U.S.'s specific objections see David J. Scheffer, The 
United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 Am. J. Int'l. L. 12 (1999) (authored 
by U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes and the leader of the U.S. delegation to the 
Rome Conference). For a general overview of the Rome Statute, including its 
jurisdictional framework, see Arsanjani. 
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plied mechanism of criminal prosecution opens up great possibilities for 
those who seek to bolster the international commitment to human rights 
n0rms.2~ At the same time, the development raises new concerns. Some 
of these are political in nature, concerning in particular the effects of 
international prosecutions on world order.24 There are also legal 
problems, those endemic to the development of new legal systems gener- 
ally and those uniquely complicated by the particular international con- 
text. The jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals thus far has had to grap 
ple with issues ranging fi-om the choice of procedural rules,25 to the 
quandary of how to fill "gaps" in the to the interpretation of the 
substantive crimes them~elves.~' 
This Note is concerned with the definition of genocide itself, specifi- 
cally the problem of genocidal mens rea. Despite the fact that the Geno- 
cide Convention is now fifty years old, the question 'What is genocide?" 
remains difficult to answer. The drafters of the Genocide Convention 
faced a range of choices, including whether the definition of genocide 
should be restricted to acts committed against only certain categories of 
victims (and, if so, which categories) and whether or not the actus reus of 
23. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to R~vanda in Seventy-Five Years: 
The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 Ham. Hum. Rts. J. 11 
(1997) (calling for the establishment of a permanent system of international criminal 
justice to enforce human rights). 
24. hlore specifically, the prospect of a more prominent role for international 
criminal tribunals has stoked a debate regarding whether or not the interests ofjustice may 
be at cross purposes with those of peace. For a sample of the debate compare Antonio 
Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 Mod. L. Rev. 1, 8-9 (1998) 
(advocating international criminal prosecutions as a response to mass atrocities), with W. 
Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to Genocide and Other Massive Violations of Human 
Rights, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1996, at 75 (cautioning against "judicial 
romanticism"). 
25. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadit, Case no. IT-941-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's 
Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, at para. 28 (Int'l Crim. 
Trib. former Yugo., Trial Chamber, Aug. 10, 1995) (stating that the tribunal is "in certain 
respects, comparable to a military tribunal, which often has limited rights of due process 
and more lenient rules of evidencen) <http://~vrc~v.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/ 
100895pm.hh-r~ (visited Nov. 4, 1999). 
26. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemovit, Case No. IT-9622, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. 
Former Yugo., Appeals Chamber, 1997) &ttp://~nnv.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/ 
judgment/71007jt3e.hh-r~ (visited Nov. 4, 1999) where the Appeals Chamber ruled that 
international criminal law did not recognize duress as a complete defense. For a critical 
appraisal of the underlying trial chamberjudgment which the appeals chamber upheld see 
Sienho Yee, The E r b i E  Sentencing Judgement: A Questionable Milestone for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 26 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 263 
(1997). 
27. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadit, Case No. IT-941-T, Opinion and Judgment, at para. 
694 (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo., Trial Chamber, May 7, 1997) (observing that the 
crime against humanity of persecution had "never been clearly definedn in either 
international or national law) &ttp://1vww.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/jugement-e/ 
970507jthh-r~ (visited Nov. 4,1999) [hereinafter Tadit Judgment]. For a critical appraisal 
of the IClY's jurisprudence see Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the tadit 
Judgment, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 2031 (1998). 
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the crime .was limited to murder, or inclusive of crimes like torture or 
even cultural destruction. And although the drafters of the Convention 
succeeded to some extent in clarifying the crime's definition, they never- 
theless produced a text that remains susceptible to remarkably divergent 
interpretations, with far-reaching implications for the scope of the Con- 
vention's application. 
Article I1 of the Genocide Convention lays out the substantive defini- 
tion of the crime as follows: 
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calcu- 
lated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group.28 
As the International Law Commission (ILC) has observed, "[t] he 
definition of the crime of genocide . . . consists of two important ele- 
ments, namely the requisite intent (mens rea) and the prohibited act (ac- 
tus r e ~ ~ ) . " * ~  The definition of the genocidal acts enumerated by the 
Convention has provoked its o~vn source of controversy, from questions 
concerning what types of acts are contemplated, to those concerning how 
many victims must be targeted.30 As regards the question of intent, the 
prevailing interpretation assumes that genocide is a crime of specific or 
special intent, involving a perpetrator who specifically targets victims on 
the basis of their group identity with a deliberate desire to inflict destruc- 
tion upon the group itself. 
While the prevailing understanding has an intuitive appeal in light of 
its World War I1 associations, this approach has difficulty translating from 
the level of general characterization to that of individual criminal liabil- 
ity. This Note proposes an alternate interpretation. Drawing upon a 
28. Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art 2. In addition to genocide, the 
Convention also identifies the following crimes: conspiracy to commit genocide, direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, complicity in 
genocide. See id. art. 3. 
29. ILC Report, supra note 14, at 87. The ILC was established by the U.N. Secretariat 
to codify international law. Although this theoretically means that the ILC simply 
identifies existing law, governments have generally accepted a progressive role for the ILC 
in the development of international law. See Oscar Schachter, International Law in 
Theory and Practice 66-69, 71-72 (1991). 
30. Although this Note focuses on the question of intent, some interpretive questions 
regarding the definition of genocidal acts are discussed below. See infra notes 145-149 
and accompanying text 
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more traditional understanding of intent, it argues that, in defined situa- 
tions, culpability for genocide should extend to those who may personally 
lack a specific genocidal purpose, but who commit genocidal acts while 
understanding the destructive consequences of their actions for the sur- 
vival of the relevant victim group. Part I lays the ground for this interpre- 
tation by considering the ambiguity of genocidal intent in the context of 
general principles of criminal law, and the Genocide Convention's draft- 
ing history. Part 11 examines the practical and theoretical problems of 
the prevailing interpretation. Part 111 lays out the proposed interpreta- 
tion of intent and defends the integrity of this model in light of antici- 
pated criticisms. 
In its 1996 commentary to the Draft Code of Crimes Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind, the International Law Commission states 
that "[tlhe prohibited [genocidal] act must be committed against an indi- 
vidual because of his membership in a particular group and as an incre- 
mental step in the overall objective of destroying the group . . . . The 
intention must be to destroy the group 'as such,' meaning as a separate 
and distinct entity, and not merely some individuals because of their 
membership in a particular groupn31 Similarly, in its recent conviction of 
Jean-Paul Akayesu, an ICTR trial chamber explained that "[t] he perpetra- 
tion of the act charged therefore extends beyond its actual commission, 
for example, the murder of a particular individual, for the realisation of 
an ulterior motive, which is to destroy, in whole or part, the group of 
which the individual is just one elementn32 This strict reading of the 
crime exemplifies the prevalent understanding of genocide: the perpe- 
trator must select victims on the basis of their group identity and must 
desire the destruction of the group as a Although the opinion 
of such authoritative sources carries its o~vn weight, there is nothing in 
the text of the Genocide Convention that requires such a reading. This 
Part considers the interpretive ambiguity of the Genocide Convention's 
intent standard. Beginning with a consideration of general criminal law 
doctrine, it shoivs that traditional understandings of intent in common 
and civil law jurisdictions have encompassed a broad range of mental 
states, a trend that has been followed by the recently adopted Rome Stat- 
31. L C  Report, supra note 14, at 88. 
32. Akayesu Judgment, supra note 21, at para. 520. 
33. See, e.g., Matthew Lippman, The Drafting of the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 3 B.U. Int'l L.J. 1,41 [hereinafter 
Lippman, Drafting] (1985) ("It is dear that under article I1 the requisite intent to commit 
genocide must be accompanied by proof of motive . . . ."). Some states have even written 
this definition into their own domestic legislation. In the United States, for example, the 
federal crime of genocide is defined in terms of a "specific intent to destroy." 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1091(a) (1994). The Senate also submitted this construction as an understanding when 
it consented to ratification of the Convention. See Resolution of Ratification (Lugar- 
Helms-Hatch Sovereignty Package), S. Exec. Rep. 2, 99th Cong., 1st sess. 27 (1985). 
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Ute of the ICC. Next, it takes a new look at the development of the con- 
cept of genocide from its first formulation by the scholar Raphael 
Lemkin in 1944 through its codification in the Genocide Convention. It 
concludes that while the drafting history does not clearly mandate a 
knowledge-based understanding of genocidal intent, neither does it 
clearly support a purpose standard. Instead, the history reveals a vigorous 
and confused debate over the intent standard that remained alarmingly 
unresolved at the time of the Convention's adoption. 
A. The Meaning of I n h t  
With its use of the word "intent," the Genocide Convention appeals 
to a central concept of criminal culpability. The problem is that the his- 
torical understanding of criminal intent has eluded uniform understand- 
ing. According to the traditional common-law doctrine, criminal perpe- 
trators intended the consequences of their actions if they knew to a 
practical certainty what the consequences of those actions would be, re- 
gardless of whether or not they deliberately sought to realize those conse- 
q u e n c e ~ . ~ ~  At the same time, however, common law jurisdictions have 
also employed an alternate model of intent-based liability. In the case of 
so-called "specific intentn crimes, liability attaches only to perpetrators 
whose actual aim or purpose is to realize certain forbidden conse- 
q u e n c e ~ . ~ ~  Typical examples are the common law crime of burglary, 
which consists of breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony 
inside, and larceny, which involves an intent to permanently deprive 
someone of her property.36 The specific intent of committing a felony or 
permanently depriving someone of her property is distinguished from 
the more conventional "general intentyy required to commit the breaking 
and entering or physically possess her property.37 
Historically, this variable usage has proved a consistent source of 
controversy and confusion for courts interpreting intent-based offenses 
without clear rules of construction. For instance, in the famous case of 
34. See, e.g., Glanville Williams, The Mental Element in Crime 20 (1965) ("Intention 
is a state of mind consisting of knowledge of any requisite circumstances plus desire that 
any requisite result shall follow from one's conduct, or else foresight that the result will 
certainly follo~v."). Professor George P. Fletcher traces this doctrinal tradition to the 
nineteenth-century utilitarian John Austin. See John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence 
433-34 (3d ed. 1869); George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law § 6.5.1 (1978). H.L.A. 
Hart makes a similar point by reference to a famous Victorian case from 1868, R v. 
Desmond, Barrett and O t b .  The accused attempted to liberate two prisoners by dynamiting 
a ~vall, knowing that there were people living nearby. Even though "[ilt was no part of 
Barrett's purpose or aim to kill or injure anyone; the victims' deaths were not a means to 
hi end; to bring them about was not his reason or part of his reason for igniting the fuse, 
but he was convicted on the ground that he foresaw their death or serious injury." H.L.A. 
Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 120 (1968). 
35. See, e.g., Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part 34 (1961). See also 
Hart, supra note 34, at 116-21. 
36. See Williams, supra note 35, at 51. 
37. See id. 
Heinonline - -  99 Colum. L. Rev. 2 2 6 6  1999 
Abram v. United States, to take an example that predates the Genocide 
Convention, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted a federal statute prohib- 
iting the unla1vfi.d uttering, printing, and writing of language "intended 
to incite, provoke and encourage resistance to the United States in [the 
rvar against Germany]" as holding defendants responsible for the natural 
consequences of their intended actions even if those actions were moti- 
vated by unrelated concerns.38 In subsequent years, however, the evolu- 
tion of First Amendment doctrine led the Court to take the opposite ap- 
proach, and construe similarly worded criminal incitement statutes more 
narro~vly according to a specific intent model.3g 
In the post-World War I1 United States, the influential Model Penal 
Code (MPC) has done much to rationalize the law of mens rea. Avoiding 
the word "intent" entirely, the Code instead divides the traditional under- 
standing of the term into three more precisely defined mental states: 
38. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). The Court upheld defendants' conviction under the 
Espionage Act of 1917. The defendants asserted that the aim of the activities for which 
they were convicted (propaganda calling, inter alia, for workers in munitions factories to 
cease producing weapons) was not to hinder the American war effort, but rather, to aid the 
cause of the Russian Revolution, against which American weapons were also being used. 
Justice Holmes' dissent, famous for its separate interpretation of the free speech 
clause of the F i t  Amendment, argued that specific intent crimes should be held to define 
specific purposes regarding consequences. However, as hi comments make dear, he did 
not see himself as pronouncing an established understanding of the law 
I am aware of course that the word intent as vaguely used in ordinary legal 
discussion means no more than knowledge at the time of the act that the 
consequences said to be intended will ensue. Even less than that ~vill satisfy the 
general principle of civil and criminal liability. A man may have to pay damages, 
may be sent to prison, at common law might be hanged, if at the time of his act 
he knew facts from which common experience showed that the consequences 
would follow, whether he individually could foresee them or not But, when 
words are used exactly, a deed is not done with intent to produce a consequence 
unless that consequence is the aim of the deed. It may be obvious, and obvious to 
the actor, that the consequence will follow, and he may be liable for it even if he 
regrets it, but he does not do the act with intent to produce it unless the aim to 
it is the proximate motive of the specific act, although there may be 
some deeper motive behind. 
Id. at 626-27. 
39. In Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 301 n.1, 320-27 (1957), for example, the 
Court found that direct advocacy of illegal action with specific intent was a necessary 
element of a Smith Act provision forbidding certain forms of advocacy committed "with 
intent to cause the overthro~v or destructionn of a United States government Such 
interpretations are a precondition of constitutionality under the test enunciated in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44, 447 (1969) (declaring unconstitutional laws that 
"forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite 
or produce such action"). 
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"reckles~ness,"~~ kn~~vledge,"~~ and "purpose,"42 the latter of which cor- 
responds to specific intent.43 States modeling their codes after the MPC 
have preserved this explicit distinction, although most have substituted 
the word "intent" for "purpose," thus redefining "intent" as specific in- 
tent.44 Yet despite this trend, broader constructions of the term persist.45 
40. The Code states that "[a] person acts recklessly with respect to a material element 
of an offenses when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
material element exists or will result from his conduct The risk must be of such a nature 
and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of hi 
conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard 
of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation." Model Penal Code 
§ 2.02(2) (d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
41. "A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct. . . he is amre that his conduct is of 
that nature . . . and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is amre that it is 
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result" Id. at § 2.02(2) (b). 
42. "A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when . . . 
if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious 
object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result . . . ." Id. at 
1 2.02(2) (a). 
43. The Code also defines a category of criminal negligence, covering cases where 
"[a] person . . . should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [a material 
element of an offense] exists or will result from his conduct" Id. at § 2.02(d). Although 
this category does not fall within traditional understandings of criminal intent, it does 
overlap with the theories of those who have sought to define intent in objective rather than 
subjective terms. Justice Holmes is the most famous advocate of this approach. Despite 
adopting a specific intent interpretation of the Espionage Act in his Abrams dissent, see 
supra note 38, Holmes generally favored an interpretation of criminal intent according to 
which the accused need only -have known of &cumstances whose tendency to cause 
prohibited results would be apparent to a reasonable man. See American Law Institute, 
Model Penal Code and Commentaries 2.02, at 234 n.9. (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985) (citing Commonwealth v. Chance, 174 Mass. 245, 252, 54 N.E. 551, 554 
(1899); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 61 (Mark DeWolfe ed., 1963) 
(1881). In 1961, influenced in part by Holmes' analysis, the British House of Lords 
interpreted the words "wounding-with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm" to assert a 
purely objective standard for murder liability, applying to all situations in which a 
reasonable man would have understood the harmful consequences of his actions. Director 
of Public Prosecutions v. Smith, [I9611 App. Cas. 290. The controversial decision .was 
subsequently overruled by statute. See P. S. Atiyah, The Legacy of Holmes Through 
Engliih Eyes, 63 B.U. L. Rev. 341, 347-49 (1983). 
44. .See, e.g., NexvYork Penal Law § 15.05(1) (McKinney 1998) (stating that a person 
acts "intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an 
offense when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such conduct). 
45. Thus, for example, in United States v. Johnson, 24 M.J. 101, 105 (C.M.A. 1987), 
the Court of Military Appeals interpreted the phrase "intent to injure or interfere with 
national defense" to mean "knowing that the result is practically certain to follow." 
Similarly, Minnesota's criminal code provides that "'[i]ntentionally' . . . '[~vlith intent to' 
or 'with intent that' means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the 
result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause that result," Minn. Stat 
§ 609.02 (1998), while the Wisconsin criminal code contains an almost identical provision 
providing that "intent," "with intent that," and "with intent ton "means that the actor either 
has a to do the thing or cause the result specified, or is aware that hi or her 
conduct is practically certain to cause that result" Wis. Stat. § 939.23 (1998) 
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The practice of civil law countries confirms the difficulty of defining 
genocidal intent. Under French law, the precise meaning of intent has 
provided a consistent source of confusion, with French courts applying 
both a stricter conception of intent and a looser, unrefined notion of do1 
g M a l ,  understood merely as "the conscious and voluntary action to vio- 
late the l a ~ . " ~ ~  German law, mean~vhile, employs specific terminology to 
define certain crimes in terms of a deliberate desire to realize specified 
consequences, but treats criminal intent in a broader sense to encompass 
perpetrators who perform criminal acts with dolus arentualis-an accept- 
ance of or willingness to realize possible criminal consequences that in 
some ways intersects with the MPC definition of reckle~sness.~~ Similarly, 
the criminal code of pre-1991 Yugoslavia, to take the example of a coun- 
try from which genocide charges have emerged, specifies a single broad 
intent standard extending liability to those who perform a deed knowing 
"it could have criminal  consequence^."^^ 
Perhaps most significantly, the recently adopted Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, the body that may ultimately play the great- 
est role in interpreting the prohibition against genocide, also embraces a 
relatively broad understanding of intent analogous to the Model Penal 
Code definition of "kno~vledge."~~ In this vein, the Statute specifies that 
"[A] person has intent where a) In relation to conduct, that person 
means to engage in the conduct; b) In relation to a consequence, that 
person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in 
the ordinary course of events."50 Ho~vever, even assuming all Euture ge- 
nocide trials are before the ICC, the statutory frame~vork only guides in- 
terpretation "[u]nless othenvise provided."51 In this way, the statute pro- 
vokes an interesting interpretive question. Although nothing in the 
statute explicitly provides for a distinct genocidal intent standard, one 
might argue that the origins and development of the prohibition against 
genocide provide an external source of interpretive authority that trumps 
the Rome Statute's d e m t  mens rea provision. If so, the central question 
46. Bartholemy Mercadel, Recherche sur l'intention en droit penal, 22 Revue de 
Science Criminelle et de Droit Penal Compare 1,20,31 (1967) (translation by author); see 
also Fletcher, supra note 34, 3 6.5 n.49. 
47. See Fletcher, supra note 34, § 4.5.2. 
48. RriviEni Zakon, art. 7. (1970) (Yugo.) ("A criminal act is committed with intent 
when the perpetrator was aware of his deed and intended its completion; or when he 
allowed himself to perform the deed despite being aware that the deed could have 
forbidden consequences." (translation by author)). See also Komentar KriviEnog Zakona 
Socijalistieke Federatime Republike Jugoslavije 12 (Nikola SSentiC ed., 1978) (stating that 
awareness and purpose are *~ndistin~uishable). 
49. See supra note 41. 
50. Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art  30(2). The Statute further specifies that 
"[flor the purposes of this article, 'knowledge' means awareness that a circumstance exists 
or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. 'Know' and 'knowingly' shall 
be construed accordingly." Id. at art  30(3). The treatment of intent and knowledge is 
thus identical with respect to the consequences of one's actions. 
51. Id. at art. 30(1). 
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remains the same as before: Does "intent" have a special meaning within 
the context of genocide? 
B. The Origins and Drafting of the Genocide Convention 
Article 32 of the widely ratified Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties states that where the terms of a treaty are "ambiguous or o b  
scure," "[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of interpreta- 
tion, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances 
of its concl~sion."~~ Unfortunately, an investigation of the origins and 
drafting of the Genocide Convention only reinforces the ambiguity of the 
treaty's intent provision. This Section looks to the history of genocidal 
intent from the coining of the term "genocide" by Raphael Lemkin in 
1944, to the completion of the Genocide Convention in 1948.53 It reveals 
that, from the start, the standard of genocidal culpability was subject to 
conflicting aspirations and interpretations that eluded resolution even at 
the final stages of the Convention's drafting. 
1. Raphael Lemkin and the Beginnings of a DeJinition. -The preamble 
to the Genocide Convention asserts that "at all periods of history Geno- 
cide has inflicted great losses on humanity."54 Despite the historical 
reach of these words, the term is of fairly recent origin, coined during 
World War I1 by the jurist Raphael Leml~ in .~~  Lemkin was a Polish citizen 
of Jewish descent who fled to the United States after Hitler invaded Po- 
land in 1939. He spent much of the war working for the U.S. govern- 
ment, during which time he collected evidence of Nazi crimes.56 In 1944 
Lemkin published Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, a documentation of the 
strategies pursued by the Axis powers against populations in occupied 
ter r i t~r ies .~~ Grouping these activities under the rubric of "genocide," 
Lemkin defined the term as follorvs: 
By "genocide" we mean the destruction of a nation or of an eth- 
nic group. This new word, coined by the author to denote an 
old practice in its modem development, is made from the an- 
cient Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin cide (kill- 
ing) . . . . Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily 
mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when ac- 
52. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
53. Thii discussion selectively focuses on what the documentary sources have to say 
about the concept of intent. For a more general treatment of the Convention's origins see 
Lippman, Drafting, supra note 33. See also Matthew Lippman: The Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Fifty Years Later, 15 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. Law 
415, 449-63 (1998) [hereinafter Lippman, Fifty Years]; Nehemiah Robinson, The 
Genocide Convention: A Commentary 17-30 (1959). 
54. Genocide Convention, supra note 2, preamble. 
55. For a general survey of Lemkin's role in the creation of the Genocide Convention, 
see LeBlanc, supra note 13, at 16-19; Lippman, Drafting, supra note 33, at 17-19. 
56. See LeBlanc, supra note 13, at 19. 
57. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944). 
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complished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is 
intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different ac- 
tions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the 
life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups 
themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegra- 
tion of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, 
national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of na- 
tional groups, and the destruction of the personal security, lib- 
erty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belong- 
ing to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national 
group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against 
individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of 
- 
the national 
As the quoted language makes clear, this original conception ap- 
plied to activities deliberately targeting specified groups-at this stage 
only national and ethnic groups-for destruction. At the same time, 
horvever, other passages reveal that Lemkin's understanding envisioned a 
range of genocidal activities so much broader than that eventually de- 
fined by the Genocide Convention that it is difficult to imagine that all of 
them could have fit within the framework of a plan to destroy a group. 
For Lemkin, "destruction of the essential foundations of a group" in- 
cluded almost any activity that was discriminatory in nature, whether ex- 
plicitly or only implicitly so, and whether it attacked the cultural or physi- 
cal existence of the group. As Lemkin's subsequent discussion makes 
clear, his definition contemplates not merely the extremities of the Holo- 
caust, but more broadly, the general relationship between the Axis pow- 
ers and virtually all the peoples of the lands they conquered. For exam- 
ple, Lemkin defined as genocidal acts ranging from the confiscation of 
property from Poles, Jews, and Czechs, to legislation encouraging the re- 
nunciation of Catholicism by Belgian youths, to "morally debasing" poli- 
cies making pornography and alcohol more affordable in .wartime Po- 
land.59 While these disparate activities might conceivably display a 
deliberate genocidal purpose when seen from the vantage of a leader 
who simultaneously pulls many strings, Lemkin was also prepared to ex- 
tend liability well beyond the architects of the "coordinated plan" consti- 
tuting genocide. In remarks urging the creation of a genocide conven- 
tion, he contemplated "the liability of persons who mder genocide 
practices, as well as of persons who execute such orders."60 
If Lemkin's understanding of genocide is elusive, this may be ex- 
plained in part by the context in which he was writing. At the time when 
58. Id. at 79. 
59. See id. at 82-90. The bulk of the book details instances of "genocide" pursued 
against the general populations (both Jewish and non-Jewish) of, inter alia, Albania, 
Austria, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Greece, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nonvay, Poland, the USSR, and Yugoslavia. See id. at 
99-264. 
60. Id. at 93. 
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he published Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, World War I1 was still in pro- 
gress and, as a result, the specific policies of the Axis powers were his 
immediate subject. In this light, his definition reads not so much as an 
attempt to clearly delineate a form of individual criminal liability, but 
rather, as an indictment of the Axis Po.cvers7 general treatment of the 
populations that they subjugated. In addition, the breadth of Lemkin's 
concept may be explained in light of the threat he perceived genocide as 
posing. Lemkin was ultimately less concerned with the evil motivations of 
genocidal acts themselves than with the preservation of the rich array of 
nations and cultures that constituted the world community. In this sense, 
Lemkin offered a Romantic vision in the Herderian traditi~n.~' As 
Lemkin wrote, 
[tlhe world represents only so much culture and intellectual 
vigor as are created by its component national groups. Essen- 
tially the idea of a nation signifies constructive cooperation and 
original contributions, based upon genuine traditions, genuine 
culture, and a well-developed national psychology. The destruc- 
tion of a nation, therefore, results in the loss of its future contri- 
butions to the 
2. The General Assably DeJinition. -This last sentiment was echoed 
by the U.N. General Assembly when it initiated the process leading to the 
adoption of the Genocide Convention. On December 11, 1946, moti- 
vated in large part by Lemkin's lobbying, the Assembly unanimously 
adopted Resolution 96 (I), declaring genocide to be an international 
crime and calling upon member states to enact legislation for its preven- 
tion and p~n i shmen t .~~  The preamble to the Resolution speaks of the 
"great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions" 
wrought by the "denial of the right of existence of entire human groups" 
and states that "many instances of such crimes have occurred when racial, 
religious, political and other groups have been destroyed, entirely or in 
part."64 The Resolution then refines this definition, affirming 
that genocide is a crime under international law which the civi- 
lized world condemns, and for the commission of which princi- 
pals and accomplices-whether private individuals, public offi- 
cials or statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on 
religious, racial, political or any other grounds-are 
p~nishable.~5 
Of course, this text does not purport to provide a statutory defini- 
tion, but its language does signal a departure from Lemkin's initial con- 
ception of genocide as a crime consisting of acts that deliberately discrim- 
inate against members of particular national or ethnic groups. In the 
61. See generally Johann Gottfi-ied von Herder, Reflections on the Philosophy of the 
History of Mankind 178691 (Frank E. Manuel ed., University. of Chicago Press 1968). 
62. Lemkin, supra note 57, at 91. 
63. G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. Doc. A/63/Add.l (1946). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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first place, the Resolution specifies no mens rea requirement whatsoever, 
refening instead to genocide simply as the destruction of human groups. 
In addition, the Resolution specifically rejects the idea that the culpability 
for genocide should depend upon the "grounds" of persecution. In this 
sense, it suggests a broader theory of mental ~ulpability.~~ 
3. The Secretariat's Draft. -And yet, if the international unanimity ex- 
hibited in the General Assembly Resolution suggested movement to~vards 
a looser standard of genocidal mens rea, subsequent attempts to define 
the crime pushed the doctrinal pendulum in the other direction. Resolu- 
tion 96(I) had turned to the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) for assistance, asking it to "undertake the necessary studies, 
with a view to drawing up a draft convention on the crime of genocide to 
be submitted to the next regular session of the General As~embly."~~ The 
ECOSOC then filfilled this request by asking the U.N. Secretariat to draw 
up a draft conven t i~n .~~  In June of 194'7 the Secretariat submitted a draft 
created by United Nations Division of Human Rights in consultation with 
three legal experts including, most notably, Raphael Lemkin himself.69 
After a series of procedural steps which included a referral back to the 
General Assembly and then back again to the ECOSOC, the next substan- 
tial step was the creation of an ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Geno- 
cide which, after considering the Secretariat's suggestions, produced yet 
another draft con~en t ion .~~  This draft ~vas ubmitted to the General As- 
sembly, where it .was further modified by the General Assembly's Sixth 
C~mmi t t e e .~~  This committee produced the final text, which later be- 
came the Genocide Convention itself.72 
Article I of the Secretariat's draft defined genocide as a "criminal act 
directed against any one of the aforesaid groups of human beings [racial, 
national, linguistic, religious, or political] with the purpose of destroying 
it in whole or in part, or of preventing its preservation or de~elopment."~~ 
66. The Resolution also provides an expansive definition of what groups may be the 
victims of genocide, referring as it does to the destruction of racial, religious, political, and 
otiw groups. In addition, it is unclear whether this Resolution follo~vs Lemkin in 
contemplating the existence of purely cultural or "spiritual" genocide, or whether it 
exclusively contemplates acts that threaten the physical existence of groups. Although the 
text does not specifically address the issue, phrases such as "the right to existence of entire 
human groups" and "groups have been destroyed," without further modification, do seem 
to connote physical destruction. The General Assembly's willingness to dispense with a 
motive requirement and espand the definition of pfotected groups into "political" and 
"othern groups further bolsters this interpretation. 
67. G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.l at 189 (1946). 
68. See Lippman, Drafting, supra note 33, at 9. 
69. See id. The other nvo experts were Professor Donnedieu de Vabres of the Paris 
Faculty of Law and Professor Pella of the International Penal Association. See id. 
70. See id. at 20-22. 
71. See id. at 37. 
72. See id. at 58. 
73. Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, U.N. ESCOR, 5th Sess., at 5, U.N. 
Doc E/447 (1947) [hereinafter Secretariat's Draft]. 
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The intent standard here is thus specifically identified as that of "pur- 
pose." In its commentary to the draft, the Secretariat emphasized that 
genocide is the deliberate destruction of a human group and that this 
strict definition "must be rigidly adhered to; othenvise there is a danger 
of the idea of genocide being expanded indefinitely . . . ."74 
4. The Ad HOC committee &&.- he second draft convention as pre- 
pared by ECOSOC7s Ad Hoc Committee marked a determined step to- 
ward the final version. The seven delegates to the Committee, represent- 
ing China, France, Lebanon, Poland, the U.S., the U.S.S.R and 
Venezuela, convened from April 5 to May 10, 1948 at Lake Success, New 
Y ~ r k . ~ ~  They produced a draft resembling the final convention in its ba- 
sic structure yet different in crucial respects. Most significantly, the Ad 
Hoc Committee included a phrase enumerating the specific "grounds" of 
genocide, so that genocidal mens rea became defined as "intent to de- 
stroy a national, racial, religious or political group on grounds of the na- 
tional or racial origin, religious belief, or political opinion of its 
 member^."'^ 
At first glance, this language appears redundant if "intent7' is con- 
strued as specific intent. If one deliberately seeks to destroy a group, 
then the realization of this goal naturally involves the selection of victims 
"on grounds" of their defining group characteristics. One might attempt 
to resolve this quandary by appealing to criminal law's traditional distinc- 
74. Id. at 16. Professor Matthew Lippman has suggested that the Secretariat 
somewhat undermined its insistence on a rigid standard by failing to specify whether the 
Convention should only prohibit physical genocide, or also include "'biological' genocide 
(the prevention of births) and 'cultural genocide.'" Lippman, Drafting, supra note 33, at 
10. Thii ambiguity contributed in part to the cool reception the draft received among 
certain U.N. member-states. See id. 
75. See Lippman, supra note 33, at 28. 
76. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide to the Economic and Social 
Council on the Meetings of the Committee Held at Lake Success, Ne~vYork, from April 5 
to May 10,1948, U.N. ESCOR, 7th Sess., Supp No. 6, U.N. Doc. E/794 (1948). The full 
definition reads as follows: 
In this Convention genocide means any of the following deliberate acts 
committed with intent to destroy a national, racial, religious or political group on 
grounds of the national or racial origin, religious belief, or political opinion of its 
members; 
1. Killing members of the group; 
2. Impairing the physical integrity of members of the group; 
3. Inflicting on members of the group measures or conditions of l i e  aimed at 
- ~ 
causing their deaths; 
4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group. 
The definition of genocidal intent includes political groups as a protected categoly and 
omits the phrase "in whole or in part" Id. Complementing Article 11, Article 111 consisted 
of a separate prohibition against cultural genocide including an almost identical intent 
standard. See id. The only difference is the omission of political groups, against whom the 
idea of cultural genocide did not seem to apply. Article 11 bears a close resemblance to the 
final Convention in its limited enumeration of genocidal acts with the latter version 
defining Articles II(2) and II(3) more strictly and adding an additional prohibition against 
the forcible transfemng of children. 
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tion behveen "intent" and "motive." Although the distinction can be ana- 
lytically bluny, intent-even specific intent-generally signifies the basic 
volition required to perform a deliberate action or seek a specific result. 
Motive, on the other hand, concerns the personal or internal reasons that 
guide one's actions, and is frequently seen as irrelevant for establishing 
criminal g u i l ~ ~ ~  In this vein, one might argue that the Ad Hoc Commit- 
tee's "on the grounds of" phrasing sought to define genocide specifically 
in terms of anti-group prejudice or animus as opposed to selection of the 
group for other reasons.78 
But the Summary Record of the Ad Hoc Committee's deliberations is 
remarkably unclear as to whether this construction of narrow construc- 
tion of motive is indeed the correct one. On a general level, the treat- 
ment of the "on grounds OF clause lacks rigorous analysis of the slippery 
slope between motive and specific intent. Indeed, neither in these nor 
any of the other deliberations leading up to the Convention's adoption is 
there any sustained discussion about what exactly "intent" or "motive" 
mean. Most significantly, while some delegates did explicitly phrase the 
issue as one of motive, much of the discussion appears to collapse motive 
and specific intent, assuming that the absence of the "on grounds of" 
phrasing would render genocide a general intent crime. 
The inclusion of the relevant clause .was initially proposed by the So- 
viet Representative and Vice-Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Moroz~v .~~  
The Record observes that when the Chairman, U.S. representative Mr. 
Maktos, suggested that the intent standard read "[iln this Convention 
genocide means intentional destruction, in whole or in part, of racial, 
national or religious groups as such,"s0 Mr. Morozov objected to the 
words "as such," and "emphasized that the qualiing fact ~vas not simply 
the destruction of certain groups but destruction for the reason that the 
people in them belonged to a given race or nationality, or had specific 
77. Wayne R W a v e  & Austin W. Scott, Jr. have described the difference in terms of 
an ends/means distinction: "Intent relates to the means and motive to the ends, but. . . 
where the end is the means to yet another end, then the medial end may also be 
considered in terms of intent Thus, when A breaks into B's house in order to get money 
to pay hi debts, it is appropriate to characterize the purpose of taking money as the intent 
and the desire to pay his debts as the motive." Wayne R LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., 
Criminal Law 228 (2d ed. 1986). As this analysis makes clear, the intent/motive distinction 
may turn more on the way one defines a crime than on essential psychological categories. 
A mental state seen as motive in one context may become a specific intent once it enters 
the definition of a crime. 
78. A distinction along these lines is often made in the literature on hate crimes. See, 
e.g., Frederick M. Lawrence, Punishing Hate: Bias Crimes Under American Law 3-4 
(1999) (distinguishing between hates crimes of "racial animus" and those of 
"discriminatory selection"). Interestingly, however, terminology such as "on the grounds 
of," absent further elaboration, would seem to denote the model of selection, not that of 
racial animus. 
79. U.N. ESCOR, 3d Sess., 10th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR10 (1948). 
80. U.N. ESCOR, 3d Sess., 11th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SRll (1948). 
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religious beliefs."81 This statement is ambiguous as to whether it sepa- 
rates the concept of motive from that of intent. But the French represen- 
tative, Mr. Ordonneau, equated motive and specific intent when he ad- 
ded that "[tlhe exact meaning should be clear. If genocide was 
destruction for any reason whatsoever, this was contra? to thepfeoious deci- 
sion that 'intention' was param~unt."~~ And later, in a similar discussion 
regarding a slightly different proposal, he made this assumption even 
more explicit when he "repeated that it was not suficient to be acquainted 
with the fact that a group had been destroyed, but that the reason for the de- 
struction had to be determined. It was there that the un1awfi.d motive of 
persecution entered."s3 
On the opposing side, Mr. Maktos perceived even broader stakes in 
defense of the "as such" phrasing. The Record states that he "believed 
that if reasons were mentioned, it might be claimed that a crime was com- 
mitted for motives other than those specified. Political groups, for in- 
stance might be eliminated on economic grounds."s4 To this end, Mr. 
Maktos proposed instead a loose standard of intent, one oddly based on 
an apparent combination of common law conspiracy doctrine and the 
felony murder rule. As the Record reveals, 
The CHAlRMAN observed that under United States law any per- 
son who participated, to any extent whatsoever, in a criminal 
act, was held responsible for the crime, even though he person- 
ally had no intention of committing it. (For instance, if a per- 
son intended to take part in a robbery and stood on watch, and 
another participant committed a murder, the accomplice was 
held responsible) .85 
In the end, however, the stricter definition triumphed as the Ad Hoc 
Committee adopted the "on grounds OF clause instead of the "as such" 
phrasing.86 
5. The Sixth Committee. -If the Ad Hoc Committee had seen the 
enumeration of "motives" as crucial to the definition of genocide, then 
the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly's re-introduction of the 
words "as such" reflected discomfort with such a narrow understanding of 
genocidal mens rea. In general, the debate resembled that of the Ad Hoc 
Committee, except that in this case those opposing the enumeration of 
motives prevailed. The change was suggested by Venezuela, whose dele- 
gate to the fifty-member committee, Mr. Perozo, argued the view gener- 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
83. U.N. ESCOR, 3d Sess., 12th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR12 (1948) 
(emphasis added). The issue here was that the Chinese delegate, Mr. Lin, suggested 
expanding the wording of the motive requirement with the words "whether on national, 
racial, religious ([plolitical) or any other grounds." Id. at 4-5. 
84. U.N. ESCOR, 3d Sess., 11th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SRl1 (1948). 
85. U.N. ESCOR, 3d Sess., 9th mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR9 (1948). 
86. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, U.N. ESCOR, 7th Sess., Supp. 
No. 6, at 5, U.N. Doc E/794 (1948); Lippman, Drafting, supra note 33, at 37. 
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ally shared by the provision's supporters, that an enumeration of motives 
was "dangerous . . . as such a restrictive enumeration would be a powerful 
weapon in the hands of the guilty and ~vould help them avoid being 
charged with genocide."s7 
Those who opposed this change maintained that the very idea of ge- 
nocide required that the crime be defined in terms of motives. For exam- 
ple, Mr. Kaeckenbeeck of Belgium argued that it 
.was not sufficient to mention intent, as it was now defined, in 
order to distinguish between genocide and other political 
crimes and crimes under common law. The main feature of ge- 
nocide was the intent to destroy a certain group . . . . The con- 
cept of intent had thus lost some of its clarity on account of an 
unfortunate confusion between acts and consequences on the 
one hand and intention on the other."ss 
Mr. Reid of New Zealand expressed similar worries, observing that 
"Modem ~ v a r  xvas total, and there might be bombing which might destroy 
whole groups. If the motives for genocide were not listed in the conven- 
tion, such bombing might be called a crime of genocide."sg The Haitian 
representative, Mr. Demesmin, offered a compromise solution, stating 
that the question of motive should not be part of the crime's definition, 
but rather, should determine whether or not the crime becomes subject 
to international jurisdiction. He maintained that if "the motives were 
such that the criminal act could be described as genocide, the appropri- 
ate tribunal would be an international tribunal; if, on the other hand, the 
motives were such that the act could be described as a crime under com- 
mon law, it would have to be dealt with by national tribunals."g0 
The statements of Mr. Kaeckenbeeck, Mr. Reid, and Mr. Demesmin 
are notable for their assumption that genocide, as defined without spe- 
cific enumeration of motive, cannot be a purpose-based crime.g1 How- 
ever, the fact that not all delegates agreed on whether or not the substitu- 
tion of the words "as such" would retain or remove a motive requirement 
confuses matters. For instance, Mr. Raafat of Egypt argued that the rvords 
simply "added yet another description of the groups covered by the con- 
87. U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 76th mtg. at 124, U.N. Doc. A/c.G/Sr. 61-140 
(1948). 
88. Id. at 122. 
89. U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 75th mtg. at 119-20, U.N. Doc. A/c.G/Sr. 
61-140 (1948). 
90. U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 76th mtg. at 125, U.N. Doc. A/c.G/Sr. 61-140 
(1948). 
91. Mr. Reid's comments are obvious on this point, since the defensive bombing 
campaign he contemplates is dearly not motivated by a desire to eliminate a group. Mr. 
Kaeckenbeeck reaches a similar conclusion when he ~vonies that the crime is turning into 
a question of "acts and consequences" instead of "intentn Mr. Demesenin is less clear on 
this point, but he too seems to imply a similar approach by distinguishing between 
genocidal motive and the intent required of crimes at common law. Elaborating on what 
he meant by common law intent, he explained that "there ~vas no crime unless there ~vas 
criminal intent" Id. 
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vention, while it did not define the motives for the crime."92 Near the 
end of the debate, Mr. Perozo attempted to clarifjr the Venezuelan propo- 
sal by stating that "as such" did indicate motives to the extent that a group 
"must be destroyed qua group," but simply achieved this result "with- 
out . . . doing so in a lirnitative form which admitted of no motives other 
than those which were listed."93 
However, this explanation did not resolve the debate. As the matter 
went to a vote, divergent interpretations persisted. Both Mr. Chaumont 
of France and Mr. Demesmin of Haiti stated that they would support the 
proposal in light of Mr. Perozo's explanation. Mr. Amado of Brazil then 
countered "that his delegation would vote for the Venezuelan amend- 
ment because it did not include the motives for the crime."94 This 
prompted Mr. Kaeckenbeeck to point out "that the Committee had to 
vote on the text of a proposal and not on the interpretation of such text, 
whether that interpretation were given by its author or by other delega- 
t i o n ~ . " ~ ~  The Chairman and Mr. Maktos of the U.S. supported this state- 
ment, as did Mr. Spiropoulos of Greece who emphasized that "interpreta- 
tion of the provisions of the convention must be left to those who would 
have to apply them."g6 After the Chairman had repeated this admonition 
again, the matter was put to a vote, and the Venezuelan phrasing passed 
by twenty-seven votes to twenty-tsvo with tsvo  abstention^.^^ Immediately 
aftenvards, Prince Wan Waithayakon of Siam indicated that he had voted 
for the provision on the understanding that it did not define genocidal 
intent as involving specific motives. The Record notes that " [h] e thought 
there were two possible interpretations of the words 'as such'; they might 
mean 'in that the group is a national, racial, religious, or political group', 
or 'because the group is a national, racial, religious or political group'. 
He himself would adopt the first of those  interpretation^."^^ 
The confusion which the "as such'' language had engendered was 
reinforced during the Committee's Seventy-Eighth Meeting on October 
19, when Mr. Rios of Uruguay asked that a working group be set up to 
consider the problem of the Venezuelan amendment. He explained that 
[Tlhe vote had given rise to three different interpretations. 
Some delegations had intended to vote for an express reference 
to motives in the definition of genocide; others had intended to 
omit motives while retaining intent; others again, among them 
the Uruguayan delegation, while recognizing that, under the 
terms of the amendment, genocide meant the destruction of a 
group perpetrated for any motives whatsoever, had wanted the 
92. Id. at 126. 
93. Id. at 131. 
94. Id. at 132. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. See id. at 133. The Record merely lists the vote count, keeping the distribution of 
votes anonymous. 
98. Id. at 133. 
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emphasis to be transferred to the special intent to destroy a 
group, without enumerating the motives, as the concept of such 
motives ~vas not sufficiently objecti~e.~~ 
Distinguishing between "motive," "special intent," and "intent" 
(which in context presumably indicates a broader understanding of in- 
tent), this ~vas the clearest statement of the interpretive possibilities that 
the deliberations would see. But it came too late. Having already voted, 
the Sixth Committee rejected the Uruguayan request for a working group 
without taking steps to clarify the interpretive question.loO The Venezue- 
lan phrasing thus became a part of the final Convention with the defini- 
tion of genocidal mens rea left unresolved.lol 
Having established that the Genocide Convention's intent standard 
is subject to multiple interpretations, this Note now takes up the concep 
tual and practical problems faced by the purposive frarne.rvork. In partic- 
ular, it focuses on nvo distinct scenarios that may render the specific in- 
tent interpretation unattractive as a statement of substantive principle 
and exceedingly difficult to apply as an evidentiary matter. The first of 
these is the challenge presented by subordinate perpetrators who claim 
merely to be canying out the genocidal directives of their superiors. The 
second is the problem posed by situations in which perpetrators know- 
ingly engage in the extermination of protected groups but in which the 
ideology of persecution evades encapsulation within the specific intent 
fixmework. 
A. Subordinate ResponsibiZiQ 
1. The Basic Problem. -As a general principle, international criminal 
law rejects the existence of superior orders as a defense for the criminal 
conduct of subordinates. Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter established 
this fundamental tenet when it specified that "[tlhe fact that the Defend- 
ant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not 
free him from responsibility. "Io2 The ICTY, ICTR, and Rome Statutes 
have also reaffirmed this general principle.lo3 The Rome Statute, more- 
over, seems to contemplate that genocidal liability can extend to those 
acting under orders when it states that "orders to commit genocide or 
99. Id. at 139. 
100. See id. at 145. 
101. As such there is reason to doubt Professor Lippman's confident assessment when 
he concludes from the Sixth Committee's Record that "[i] t is clear that under article I1 the 
requisite intent to commit genocide must be accompanied by proof of motive." Lippman, 
Drafting, supra note 33, at 41. 
102. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 11, at art. 8. 
103. See ICIYStatute, supra note 19, at art. 7(4); ICTR Statute, supra note 19, at art 
6(4); Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art, 33. 
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crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawfi~l ."~~~ Similarly, as demon- 
strated above, Raphael Lemkin argued that genocidal liability should ex- 
tend to those who followed orders as well as to those who executed 
them.1°5 This sentiment also appears in Article V of the Secretariat's 
draft, which stated that "command of the law or superior orders shall not 
justify genocide."lo6 
Ho~vever, as the Secretariat's own language admits, superior orders is 
a potential defense, not a standard of liability. But the issue in the case of 
genocide is that a defendant might invoke superior orders to negate the 
genocidal intent required for the establishment of a prima facie case, ir- 
respective of what excuses the defendant might invoke. During the meet- 
ings of the Ad Hoc Committee (which strongly favored a strict motive 
standard), the Lebanese delegate recognized this point and successfully 
moved to delete any reference to superior orders from the Committee's 
draft.lo7 The provision was never reintroduced, and, as a result, the Con- 
vention itself is silent on the question of superior orders. 
This aspect of genocidal intent poses a particular problem given the 
type of "administrative massacre" presented by the Holocaust, where a 
state deploys an entire bureaucracy and military chain of command to 
104. Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art 33(2). Although the quoted phrase itself 
says nothing about subordinate liability for genocide, the context is clear. Article 33(1) 
outlines the limited exception to the doctrine of subordinate responsibility by specifying 
that liability does not extend to a subordinate who followed unla~vll  orders as long as the 
subordinate "~vas under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or superior in 
question," the subordinate "did not know that the order ~vas unlawful," and the order itself 
\vas not "manifestly l a w . "  Id. 
The Kc's commentary to its Draft Code of Code of Crimes Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind makes similar assumptions when it states that "[a] subordinate is 
presumed to know the intentions of his superiors when he receives orders to commit the 
prohibited acts against individuals who belong to a particular group. He cannot escape 
responsibility if he carries out the orders to commit the destructive acts against victims who 
are selected because of their membership in a particular group by claiming that "he ~vas 
not privy to all aspects of the comprehensive genocidal plan or policy. The law does not 
permit an individual to shield himself from criminal responsibility by ignoring the 
obvious." ILC Report, supra note 14, at 90. To the extent that this statement contemplates 
a form of principal responsibility for genocide, it presents an obvious conflict with the ILC 
advocacy of a specific intent standard. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
However, it appears that the ILC may be desuibig a type of derivative liabkty'similar to 
that pronounced by the IClX in the Akajesu judgment. See infra notes 115-121 and 
accompanying text 
105. See supra note 60 and accompanying text 
106. U.N. ESCOR, 4th Sess. at 5, U.N. Doc E/W7 (1947). 
107. "Mr. Azkoul (Lebanon) thought that special attention should be given to 
offenders who committed a crime of genocide on superior orders. For although orders 
could notjustify the crime, they could alter its nature. The concept of genocide ~vas a new 
concept, implying murder with intent to commit genocide. An offender could participate 
in an act of genocide although he ~vas not personally prompted by the specific intention of 
destroying'a group of human bodies as such. The Committee agreed that before deciding 
that a State ~vas guilty of genocide, the motives that had inspired its action must be 
established." U.N. ESCOR, 3d Sess., 9th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.9 (1948). 
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realize the genocidal plan. In such scenarios almost everyone, including 
high-ranking perpetrators, is a subordinate on some level. This is not to 
say that a genocidal purpose could never be demonstrated when a person 
commits genocidal acts under orders. For example, one might argue that 
the very nature of certain orders requires a subordinate to exercise a spe- 
cific genocidal intent. In this vein, when the District Court of Jerusalem 
convicted Adolf Eichmann under an Israeli version of the prohibition 
against genocide, it rejected the plea of superior orders by stating that 
"the very \vide compass of [Eichmann's] activities" testified to his in- 
tentlog Although the court did not make itself entirely clear, this state- 
ment appears to argue that Eichmann's role in the collection and trans- 
portation ofJewish victims to death camps was so broad that any order he 
may have followed was equivalent to a directive stating "organize the de- 
struction of the Jewish people." As such, Eichmann could not have per- 
formed his duties without directing himself tolvards their ultimate genoci- 
dal purpose. 
But this example may depend excessively on the contingencies of 
Eichmann's specific role. Suppose instead that Eichmann were the head 
of a death camp and that his role ~vas to oversee the daily killing of which- 
ever prisoners happened to arrive. In this case Eichmann performs an 
assigned task in full knowledge that he is personally effecting the destruc- 
tion of an entire people, but his specific duties require no particular atti- 
tude toward the identity of his preselected victims. Now it seems that the 
only way to demonstrate a specific genocidal intent is to show that Eich- 
mann himself is personally motivated by a desire to participate in geno- 
cide. Yet even assuming that such motives are demonstrable (as is un- 
likely to be the case in many instances of subordinate liability) this 
possibility raises legitimate questions as to whether Eichmann's o w  rea- 
sons for following orders should matter as question of substantive princi- 
ple, particularly given the extent to which his specific duties may be inci- 
dental to those motives. 
The danger of adhering to a specific intent standard in such situa- 
tions is not merely that culpable perpetrators will escape liability for ge- 
nocide, but perhaps more ominously that the evidentiary problems will 
compel courts to squeeze ambiguous fact patterns into the specific intent 
paradigm. This potential is apparent in the ICTR's treatment of genoci- 
dal intent in its historic Akayesu judgment.log Although the trial chamber 
108. Attorney General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 228 
(D.C. Jm. 1961). 
109. The charges against the accused centered on his responsibility for the massacre 
and rape of between 2,000 and 7,000 Tutsi civilians in Rwanda's Taba commune, where 
Akayesu occupied the senior political post of bourgmestre. Akayesu Judgment, supra note 
21, at paras. 48-77, 157-268. Among the notable aspects of the judgment is the court's 
holding that Akayesu's genocidal liability derived in part from hi liability for rape, found 
to be a means of preventing procreation among Tutsi and thus a genocidal act. See id. at 
paras. 508, 732-34. These events took place withim the general context of systematic 
atrocities committed against Rwanda's Tutsi minority in 1994. See id. at paras. 78-129. 
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cited specific evidence that the accused Jean-Paul Akayesu himself had 
acted with a deliberate genocidal purpose,l1° it also lamented that geno- 
cidal intent "is a mental factor which is difficult, even impossible, to de- 
termine."ll1 To this end it posed a broad evidentiary standard, stating 
that "it is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a particular 
act charged from the general context of the perpetration of other culpa- 
ble acts systematically directed against that same group, whether these 
acts were committed by the same offender or by others."ll2 The use of 
circumstantial evidence to demonstrate mens rea is of course nothing 
new, but the ICTR's standard suggests that courts should presume spe- 
cific intent largely by virtue of the fact that a perpetrator participates in a 
genocidal campaign. In this way, it begs the question as to whether the 
specific intent standard does any work at the individual level.l13 
- 
2. Circumventing Spen>c ~ n & t  wIth Complicig Doctrine. -In addition 
to enunciating a broad evidentiary standard for specific genocidal intent, 
the Akayesu judgment also suggested another strategy to avoid the restric- 
tive framework of the specific intent paradigm: deployment of a broad 
complicity framework. Despite finding Akayesu to be guilty of genocide 
as a principal perpetrator, the court also took the position that a perpe- 
trator lacking specific genocidal intent could nevertheless be guilty of 
complicity in genocide for knowingly aiding or abetting a principal who 
does possess the requisite intent.l14 Once again, however, while the 
For a history of the Rwandan genocide, see Grard Prunier, The R~vandan Crisis: History 
of a Genocide (1997). 
110. In reaching this judgment, the court ~vas able to look not merely at the fact that 
Akayesu had participated in a broader genocidal campaign, but moreover that he had 
made public statements calling for the extermination of Tutsi. See Akayesu Judgment, 
supra note 21, at paras. 332-62. 
111. Id. at para. 523. 
112. Id. 
113. The implications of such evidentiary imputations may extend beyond doctrinal 
a~vkwardness and the risk of inconsistent determinations. To return to the Eichmann case, 
Hannah Arendt's famous account of the Jerusalem trial poignantly depicts the 
prosecution's attempts to characterize the accused as a rabid anti-Semite personally 
committed to the extermination of the Jewish people. See Hannah Arendt, ~ichmann & 
Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1994). For Arendt, however, the truly 
disturbing aspect of Eichmann's crimes ~vas the "banality" of Eichmann's evil, the fact that 
"[hle 'personally' never had anything against the Jews" and that "[dlespite all the efforts of 
the prosecution, everyone could see that thi man ~vas not a 'monster.'" Id. at 26, 54. 
illthough the trial court found specific intent on grounds that did not require inquiry into 
motive, see supra note 108 and accompanying text, the appellate judgment upholding the 
conviction embraced the prosecution's narrative, and referred, inter alia, to the "fanatical 
enthusiasm and the insatiable bloodthirstiness of the appellant and those who did hi 
bidding." Attorney General of the Government of Israel v. AdolfEichmann, 36 1.L.R 277. 
340 (S. Ct. 1962), Arendt, at 249. The problematics of fictionalization are of course not 
reducible to the interpretation of genocidal intent. However, to the extent that the 
specific intent paradigm increases the pressure to rely on such demonizing narratives, it is 
possible to see how adherence to a specific intent standard could promote a simplistic 
social understanding of human evil. 
114. Akayesu Judgment, supra note 21, at para. 540. 
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court's solution may have the end result of extending genocidal liability 
to subordinates who lack specific intent, the approach in some ways 
seems an attempt to uphold the specific intent standard while simultane- 
ously evading it. 
In their conventional application, doctrines of derivative liability pro- 
vide a means of attaching criminal responsibility to perpetrators who do 
not themselves perform the physical act constituting the actus reus of the 
relevant crime.l15 In this sense, conviction for genocide is almost by its 
very nature a crime of complicity. In the Eichmann judgment, for exam- 
ple, the Jerusalem District Court looked to derivative liability doctrine as 
a means of connecting Eichmann's genocidal mens rea to the countless 
acts of killing which he furthered but did not personally perform.l16 At 
the same time, however, the Jerusalem court treated genocidal mens rea 
as a core requirement of Eichmann's culpability.l17 The same principle 
has held true in the recent ICTR judgments, all of which found the ac- 
cused to be guilty of genocide on a combination of genocidal intent and 
command responsibility for genocidal acts.l18 
But the trial chamber's curious dictum in Akayau pushes the deriva- 
tive liability fi-amework one level further. Take, for example, the case 
where perpetrator A, lacking specific intent, physically exterminates 
members of a protected victim group. By these acts alone, perpetrator A 
is guilty of murder. But perpetrator B, who has ordered these acts with 
specific genocidal intent, is thus guilty of genocide by way of his complic- 
ity in A's actions. Under the ICTR's analysis A's knowledge of B's pur- 
poses will have the further effect of rendering A guilty by way of complic- 
ity in B's genocidal crime. Thus, despite the fact that A himself has 
committed the actus reus of genocide, he is only ~ul~able'because h is 
115. See Fletcher, supra note 34, at § 8.5. 
116. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 230-37. 
117. Id. at 228. 
118. See Kayishema Judgment, supra note 21, at paras. 551-71; Akayesu Judgment, 
supra note 21, at paras. 702-34. Interestingly, the ICTR Statute imposes a negligence- 
based command responsibility standard, providing that a superior is responsible for a 
subordinate's genocidal acts if the superior "knew or had reason to know that the 
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take 
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators 
thereof." ICTR Statute, supra note 19, at art. 6(3). As a result, this standard sets the stage 
for a curious avo-tier analysis whereby responsibility for genocide rests on a juxtaposition 
of specific intent with regard to genocidal mens rea and negligence with regard to 
genocidal acts (or even the mere after-the-fact failure to punish such acts). It is thii 
combination of elements that appears to inform the Akajesu court's othenvise confusiig 
statement that "[~vlith regard to the crime of genocide, the offender is culpable only when 
he has committed one of the offences charged under Article 2(2) of the Statute with the 
clear intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group. The offender is culpable 
because he knew or should have known that the act committed xvould destroy, in whole or 
in part, a group." Akayesu Judgment, supra note 21, at para. 520. 
The Rome Statue adopts a similar approach, holding military commanders to a 
"should have known" standard, but applying a somewhat s&cter standard of "conscious 
disregardn in the case of civilian superiors. See Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art 28. 
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complicit in someone else's complicity in his o~vn actions. In the end, 
this curious approach presents an awkward circumvention of the specific 
intent requirement. 
This is not to say, however, that the complicity approach is entirely 
irrational. On a certain level, it taps into an intuitive understanding that 
all individual perpetrators are complicit in a larger crime, the "coordi- 
nated plan of different actionsn identified by Lemkin as constituting ge- 
nocide.llg By redefining the crime at this level, one might appeal to a 
standard of conspiracy liability, such as that provided by Article 25 (3) (d) 
of the Rome Statute, which specifies that "a person shall be criminally 
responsible . . . for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that 
person . . . in any . . . way contributes to the commission or attempted 
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common 
purpose."120 As the statute further elaborates, the liability requirements 
are satisfied where the contribution is "intentional" and "made in the 
knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime."l2l 
Framed in these terms, the specific crime of an individual subordinate 
might constitute a sort of inchoate offense, performed in knowing fur- 
therance of the larger actus reus of group destruction. 
Whether the future International Criminal Court will construct this 
provision broadly enough to cover subordinate perpetrators remains to 
be seen. If it does, it will face difficult questions regarding how to place 
principled limitations on the potential scope of liability, particularly if the 
Court views entire civil and military bureaucracies either as acting with a 
common criminal purpose or as contributing to the criminal purpose of a 
leadership ~ 1 a s s . l ~ ~  The conspiracy fkme~vork may also be over-inclusive 
in a different sense. As suggested above, the extension of genocidal liabil- 
ity under Article 25 (3) (d) requires individual genocidal acts to be viewed 
as inchoate contributions to a larger crime. Under the terms of the stat- 
ute, this reconceptualization would extend the liability of particular con- 
tributors to the entire genocidal campaign. An individual soldier who 
commits a murder under orders is now guilty of the entire genocide, and 
not simply one genocidal act. As a "one-size-fits-all" theory of liability, this 
solution to the problem of subordinate liability may elide important dis- 
tinctions in the scope of individual responsibility. In addition, it will fly in 
the face of the current practice of the ICTR, whose judgments have care- 
119. See supra note 60 and accompanying test. 
120. Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art 25(3) (d). 
121. Id. 
122. The use of conspiracy doctrine represented a particularly controversial aspect of 
the Nuremberg trials precisely because of its potential to greatly expand the scope of 
criminal liability. For an overview see Stanislaw Pomorski, Conspiracy and Criminal 
Organizations, in The Nuremberg Trial and International Law 213 (George Ginsburgs & 
V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990). 
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fully defined genocidal crimes in terms of the particular criminal acts for 
which the relevant perpetrators have been directly re~ponsib1e.l~~ 
B. Ambiguous Motives 
Even assuming, however, that an emerging international norm of 
complicity may assign genocidal liability to subordinates who knowingly 
further a superior's genocidal designs, this doctrinal development will do 
little to address a second type of situation: that in which a group falls 
prey to discriminatory extermination in a campaign of persecution that 
lacks a clear objective to destroy the group in its collective sense. Take, 
for example, the atrocities committed in Cambodia during the 1970s. 
Under the leadership of Pol Pot, the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
Center, or Khmer Rouge, killed an estimated 1.5 million people, about 
hventy percent of the Cambodian population, between 1975 and 1979.124 
Although members of one of Cambodia's ethnic groups, the Muslim 
Chams, were particularly targeted by the terror, the fact that the cam- 
paign .was committed in the name of communist ideology makes it diffi- 
cult to fit this destruction within the model of a purpose to destroy a 
group qua g r 0 ~ p . I ~ ~  Similarly, between 1962 and 1972 as many as fifty 
percent of Paraguay's Northern AchC Indians were killed as part of an 
effort to fkee AchC territory for economic deve10pment.l~~ When asked 
about these events, the Paraguayan Defense Minister admitted the attacks 
but denied that the requisite genocidal intent existed since the purpose 
of the campaign was to further economic development and not to destroy 
the Ache as a group.12' One can anticipate similar explanations for the 
Bosnian Serb Army's slaughter of thousands of unarmed Bosnian Muslim 
men and boys, following the capture of the U.N.-declared "safe haven" of 
Srebrenica. The ICTY has indicted former Bosnian Serb President 
Radovan KaradZiC and General Ratko MladiS. for genocide because of 
their respective roles in the attack,128 but there is some evidence that the 
slaughter was perceived at least in part as targeting military-age men (lib- 
123. See Kayishema Judgment, supra note 21, at paras. 546-71; Akayesu Judgment, 
supra note 21, at paras. 704-34. 
124. For a history of the Cambodian atrocities see Kiernan, supra note 15. 
125. See id. at 460-63. 
126. See Mark Mfinzel, Manhunt, in Genocide in Paraguay 19,38-39 (Richard Arens 
ed., 1976). See also Lippman, Fifty Years, supra note 53. 
127. Richard Arens, A Lawyer's Summation, in Genocide in Paraguay 132, 141 
(Richard Arens ed., 1976) ("The Paraguayan Minister of Defense, General Marcia1 
Samaniego, has ackno~vledged the attacks on the Ache nation. Addressing himself to the 
constituent elements of genocide as defined by the Genocide Convention, he chose to 
deny solely the element of 'intent to destroy.' 'Although there are victims and victimizers, 
there is not the third element necessary to establish the crime of genocide-that is 'intent' 
Therefore, as there is no intent, one cannot speak of genocide.'"). 
128. See Prosecutor v. KaradiiE, Case No. IT-9518, Indictment (Int'l Cnm. Tnb. 
former Yugo., Nov. 14, 1995) &ttp://1mnv.un.org/icty/indictment/engfish/95l&i.h~ 
(visited Nov. 4, 1999). 
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erally understood) to avenge and deter attacks by Bosnian government 
forces.**9 
These examples are disturbing because it is seems that, on some 
level, the tormentors devalue the lives of the victims precisely because of 
their group identity. Indeed, commentators have routinely relied on the 
combination of anti-group discrimination and massive destruction to 
characterize all three of these situations as genocidal.130 Yet as the ILC 
has observed, the specific intent approach to genocide requires more 
than discriminatory selection accompanied by knowledge of the conse- 
quences of one's actions. Rather, "the intention must be to destroy the 
group . . . as a separate and distinct entity, and not merely some individu- 
als because of their membership in a particular group."131 In other 
words, a specific intent to destroy a group requires a particular mental 
attitude toward the collective survival of the group as a distinct unit. Yet 
in cases where the proclaimed motive of persecution is something other 
than that of group destruction, this attitude may be absent or difficult to 
identify. One might argue that such situations constitute genocide on 
the theory that genocidal purpose can be a means and not an end.lS* 
Certainly, one could not exonerate Hitler on the grounds that his pur- 
pose was the pursuit, for example, of "German purity" and that the de- 
struction of Jews was merely a means to this end. But exploration of hy- 
129. See David Rhode, Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's 
Worst Massacre Since World War I1 215-16, 349 (1997); see also Jan Wilem Honig & 
Norbert Both, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime 56-57,176-7'7 (1996). 
130. In Paraguay, the destructive acts involved the killing of AchC in organized 
manhunts and the selling of AchC women into slavery and prostitution. See Miinzel, supra 
note 126, at 20. Richard Arens makes the case as follows: "The Achi, then, are biologically 
and culturally inferior, and they are inconvenient to industry and agriculture. On those 
two perceptions rests genocide." Arens, supra note 127, at 141. Elie Wiesel, normally 
reluctant to compare situations to the Holocaust, made an exception in this case: "I read 
the stories of the-suffering and death of the AchC tribe in paraGay and recognize famiiar 
signs . . . . There are here indications, facts which cannot be denied: it is indeed a matter 
of a Final Solution." Elie Wiesel, Now We Know, in Genocide in Paraguay 166 (Richard 
Arens ed., 1976). 
Events in Bosnia took place within the context of well-publicized "ethnic cleansing," 
involving mass murder, mass torture, mass rape, and forced displacement of Muslim and 
Croat civilians. For a general account of these events, see, e.g., Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A 
Short History 234-52 (1994); David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the 
West 96-116 (1996); Laura Siber & Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation 244-57 
(1996). 
As regards Cambodia, historian Ben Kiernan applies a purpose standard to argue that 
the Khmer Rouge did in fact commit genocide against the Chams. See Kiernan, supra 
note 15, at 460-63. The key for Kiernan is evidence of particular discrimination against 
Chams, such as the fact that Chams were often forced to eat pork in violation of their 
Muslim beliefs. See id. at 461. From this he concludes that the Khmer Rouge targeted the 
Chams "for racial reasons," and thus, he extrapolates, they intended to destroy the Chams 
"as such." Id. at 462. 
131. KC Report, supra note 14, at 88. 
132. This point recalls LaFave & Scott's distinction between motive and intent. See 
supra note 77 &d accompanying text. 
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pothetical scenarios based on this example simply reveal the extent to 
which purpose to destroy a group qua group exists on a continuum that 
resists analytical discrimination. To take the example of the Ach6, one 
can imagine a situation in which it would be difficult to distinguish be- 
meen targeting an indigenous people because;as a collective group, they 
are considered to be an obstacle to economic development, and an objec- 
tive to clear a certain land accompanied by a discriminatory indifference 
to Ache lives. Similarly, in the case of massacres motivated by political 
ideology one can distinguish between, on the one hand, forms of "posi- 
tive persecution" that deliberately target entire groups as groups, and, on 
the other hand, "negative persecutions" that view certain group charac- 
teristics, such as linguistic or cultural traits, as threatening to the domi- 
nant ideology, but that are in some larger sense indifferent as to whether 
the group itself assimilates or is de~tr0yed.l~~ 
Such cases draw a blurry line. And defenders of the specific intent 
approach will argue that the role of a strict standard is to prevent doctri- 
nal expansion along a slippery slope that destroys the particular focus of 
the prohibition against genocide by converting almost every act of large- 
scale destruction into a form of genocide. This argument is most persua- 
sive in cases where the threat to group survival is posed by actions lacking 
a discriminatory selection of victims.134 However, to the extent that vic- 
133. Along these lines, Professor Lippman criticizes the Genocide Convention for 
imposing an intent standard that allows individuals "to evade responsibility by portraying 
the violence against these groups as having been based on political grounds or are able to 
argue that the violence .was incidental to the achievement of non-genocidal purposes." 
Lippman, Fifty Years, supra note 53, at 507. Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni mounts a similar 
attack on the specific intent standard, focusing on the evidentiary problems of proving 
intent. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia § 8.3.3.3 (1996). However, both arguments assume that the specific 
intent interpretation is in fact the correct interpretation of genocide's statutory definition. 
134. As discussed above, concerns were raised during the Sixth Committee 
deliberations that an expansive definition of genocide might become simply synonymous 
with modem war. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. Such concerns reemerged 
during the Viemam War when the so-called "Russell Tribunal," a body formed by the 
philosopher Bertrand Russell in 1968 to "try" the U.S. government for ~var crimes, accused 
the U.S. of genocide. See Against the Crime of Silence: Proceedings of the International 
War Crimes Tribunal (John D a e t  ed., 1970). In his contribution to the proceedings, the 
philosopher Jean-Paul Same conceded that the authors of this crime may not have been 
"thoroughly conscious of their intentionsn but insisted that the logic of American 
imperialism nevertheless presupposed genocide. Jean-Paul Sartre, On Genocide, in 
Against the Crime of Silence: Proceedings of the International War Crimes Tribunal 612, 
623 (John DufFet ed., 1970). Thii analysis garnered much criticism even from those 
othenvise outraged by U.S. conduct in the war. For example, Hugo Adam Bedau argued 
that the case for genocide ~ v a s  weak under any theory of uiminal intent. See Hugo Adam 
Bedau, Genocide in Viemam?, in Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs 3,2146 
(Virginia Held et al. eds., 1974). Richard Falk, meanwhile, agreed that accusation of 
were implausible under an "Indictment Model" geared toward criminal 
prosecution, but suggested that the U.S. might still be liable for genocide under a looser 
"Responsibility Model" of political and moral obligation. See Richard A. Falk, Ecocide, 
Genocide, and The Nuremberg Tradition of Individual Responsibility, in Philosophy, 
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tims already are singled out on the basis of their group membership, the 
requirement that broader group destruction be a desired rather than 
foreseen consequence may be overly strict. Here, as in the paradigmatic 
cases of genocide, targeted persecutions threaten the collective survival of 
vulnerable groups. PorverfUl arguments dictate that in such cases genoci- 
dal liability should not depend on the contingencies of ideological or 
political motives. 
Part I1 has highlighted the conceptual difficulties inherent in inter- 
preting genocidal intent as requiring that the perpetrator possess a spe- 
cific purpose to destroy a group qua group. This Note now suggests the 
following alternative: In cases where a perpetrator is othenvise liable for 
a genocidal act, the requirement of genocidal intent should be satisfied if 
the perpetrator acted in furtherance of a campaign targeting members of 
a protected group and knew that the goal or manifest effect of the cam- 
paign was the destruction of the group in whole or in part. Drawing 
upon the Genocide Convention's core concern for the permanent losses 
to humanity that result from the annihilation of enumerated groups,135 
this approach emphasizes the destructive result of genocidal acts instead 
of the specific reasons that move particular individuals to perform such 
acts. It addresses the related problems of subordinate actors and ambigu- 
ous goals by unhinging the question of genocidal liability fi-om that of the 
perpetrator's particular motive or desires with regard to the group as a 
whole. And in the particular case of subordinate perpetrators, it does so 
without relying on an expansive liability framework that would attach lia- 
bility for acts that are far beyond the direct responsibility of the particular 
perpetrator. In this way, it seeks to assert a more objective and principled 
standard of liability than that offered by the specific intent 
ir1terpretati0n.l~~ 
Moxality, and International Affairs 123 (Virginia Held et al. eds., 1974). For a discussion 
and analysis of this debate that includes consideration of the Paraguay problem see 
Lippman, Fifty Years, supra note 53 at 47682. 
135. The centrality of this concern is evident in the Convention's preamble, which 
notes "that in all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity." 
Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at preamble. As discussed above, Lemkin had also 
emphasized thii consideration as a rationale for enacting the prohibition against genocide. 
See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text In addition, the Secretariat's Draft 
Convention explicitly stated "the purpose of this Convention is to prevent the destruction 
of [enumerated] groups of human beings." Secretariat's Draft, supra note 73, at 5. 
136. Despite its comparatively objective approach, however, the proposed 
interpretation retains the subjective element of knowledge. In this way, it differs from the 
entirely objective, and somewhat open-ended standard advanced by Leo Kuper, who 
suggests that "intent is established if the foreseeable consequences of an act are, or seem 
likely to be, the destruction of a group." Leo Kuper, The Prevention of Genocide 12 
(1985). 
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This Part elaborates on the proposed standard in light of some antic- 
ipated criticisms and obstacles. It argues first that the proposed interpre- 
tation can be read consistently with the language of the prohibition 
against genocide without achieving absurd results. Next, it argues that 
the proposed reading retains a distinct place for the prohibition against 
genocide within the canon of international criminal law. 
A. The Text of the Convention 
1 .  "Intent". - The proposed reading of genocidal intent combines 
avo elements: selection of group members on the basis of their group 
identity and knowledge regarding the destructive consequences of one's 
actions for the survival of the group. As is evident from the discussion in 
Part I, the second of these elements-knowledge as to consequences of 
actions-represents one possible reading of the word "intent" in light of 
traditional criminal law doctrine and the drafting history of the Conven- 
tion. In particular, it coincides with the default intent standard imposed 
by the recently-adopted Rome Statute of the ICC.13' The notion of 
targeted selection, on the other hand, does not fol1o.c~ directly from the 
word "intent" itself. However, it may be implied from other language in 
the prohibition against genocide, particularly the notion that genocidal 
acts may involve "killing members of the Similarly, the general 
contest of the Genocide Convention's drafting, which displayed a consis- 
tent concern for the persecution of people on the basis of group mem- 
bership, supports this conclusion. 
Ultimately, ho~vever, the proposed standard represents an attempt to 
reconcile the confused and conflicting concerns that pervaded the draft- 
ing and application of the prohibition against genocide. The element of 
knowledge addresses the difficulties of requiring and proving a specific 
purposive attitude toward the survival of a group in its collective exist- 
ence. By requiring an element of selection, the proposal reasserts that 
genocide is a targeted crime, and thus addresses at least some of the dm- 
gers posed by an open-ended definition that does not require specific 
intent to destroy a group qua group. 
It is important to emphasize, however, that the proposed standard 
does not contemplate that every individual perpetrator must necessarily 
select victims on the basis of their group identity. Rather, it views selec- 
tion as part of the general context in which victims are targeted. To the 
extent that an individual perpetrator may target pre-selected victims, 
knowledge of the criteria for selection should be enough to extend liabil- 
ity. Similarly, the proposed conception of selection does not establish a 
"motive" requirement along the lines intimated by some delegates during 
the drafting of the Genocide Convention. For the purposes of the pro- 
posed standard it should be irrelevant whether or not perpetrators act 
137. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
138. Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at art. 2(a). 
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out of a particular anti-group animus. To return to the Srebrenica situa- 
tion, for example, the possibility that Muslim identity served merely as a 
proxy for targeting potential combatants in the Bosnian army should be 
irrelevant to the question as to whether victims were selected on the basis 
of their group identity.139 
2. "In whole or in part". - The Genocide Convention's inclusion of 
the words "in part" clearly seems to indicate that genocide can occur 
when the relevant intent extends to the destruction of some but not all of 
the protected group.140 But the text of the Convention gives little guid- 
ance as to what exactly constitutes a "partn This fact poses problems for a 
knowledge-based interpretation to the extent that the word "part" is inter- 
preted as establishing a relatively low bar. At the extreme, a culprit who 
murders avo persons because they belong to the same religious group 
might conceivably be guilty of genocide since the man has acted "knorv- 
ing" that the manifest effect of his intentions amounts to destroying a 
part (i.e. avo members) of a group.141 It is important to recognize, how- 
ever, that the same problem exists under the strict purpose standard to 
the extent that the perpetrator may want only to destroy a miniscule por- 
tion of a group. 
The drafting history of the Genocide Convention is somewhat con- 
fusing in this regard. The wording "in whole or in part" was proposed 
during the Sixth Committee's meetings by the Norwegian delegate, who 
ambiguously explained that "the Norwegian delegation simply wanted to 
point out . . . that it was not necessary to kill all the members of a group 
in order to commit genocide."14* As one commentator has observed, 
such language suggests that the drafters may have been less focused on 
intent per se than on the question of how complete the actual destruc- 
tion of a group need be before a particular persecution could be de- 
scribed as gen0~idal . l~~ At the very least, it does not appear that the 
drafters contemplated a radical expansion of the concept of genocide. 
Echoing these sentiments, the ILC has supported relatively strict con- 
struction, writing that "[i] t is not necessary to intend to achieve the com- 
plete annihilation of a group from every corner of the globe. Nonethe- 
less, the crime of genocide by its very nature requires the intention to 
destroy at least a substantial part of a particular 
139. See supra note 130 and accompanying text 
140. See Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at art 2. 
141. I use the exarnde of two victims because the Genocide Convention defines the 
relevant actus reus using a plural construction: "[klilling members of the group." Id. art 
2 (a). 
142. UN GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 73d mtg. at 97, U.N. Doc. A/c.G/Sr. 61-140. 
(1948). 
143. See LeBlanc, supra note 13, at 37-38. 
144. ILC Report, supra note 14, at 89 (emphasis added). The term "substantial part" 
also figures in the understanding that the United States submitted when it ratified the 
Convention. See Resolution of Ratification (Lugar-Helms-Hatch Sovereignty Package), S. 
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One might question whether a "substantial part" test is necessary in 
cases where the individual perpetrator either possesses or knowingly fur- 
thers a specific genocidal intent. At least to the extent that culpability is 
based on knowledge of destructive effects, ho~vever, it makes sense to set 
a high bar. In cases where genocide involves a threat of massive destruc- 
tion, the requirement of a specific intent to destroy seems particularly 
incidental. To this end, the proposed interpretation of genocidal intent 
requires that the perpetrator be aware that the campaign of persecution 
poses a very serious threat to future survival of either the group as a 
whole, or a clearly defined segment of the group (such as the Kosovo 
Albanians or the Iraqi Kurds). 
3. Genocidal Acts. - A different set of questions addresses the rela- 
tionship between a knowledge standard and the genocidal acts enumer- 
ated by the Genocide Convention. Although this Note has generally con- 
templated that genocide will assume the most paradigmatic form of mass 
murder, it is important to recognize that the Convention's language de- 
fines a broader scope of activities as genocidal. Article II(a), for example, 
merely prohibits "[klilling members of the without specifying 
that such killing take the form of murder. The other enumerated acts 
fall short of actual killing and include ambiguously phrased acts like 
"[ilmposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
By combining such phrasing with a knowledge standard of liability it is 
possible to imagine strained applications of the Genocide Convention, 
for example to a large-scale ~var of attrition, conducted according to rules 
of war, but resulting in the decimation of a country's p0pu1ation.l~~ 
- - 
One might argue that a purpose standard is necessary to contain the 
definition of genocide within the sphere of activities that are properly 
defined as criminal. But as with the definition of "in whole or in part," 
the problem is somewhat separable fi-om the question of genocidal in- 
tent. In general, the interpretive trend has been to construct the relevant 
genocidal acts in such a way that each involves an independent criminal 
wrongdoing. This is precisely what the ICTR Trial Chamber does in the 
Akajau case when it construes the word "killing" as signifying murder.148 
The ILC has also sought to limit the scope of the enumerated acts, main- 
taining that they are all coercive in nature and must threaten the "physi- 
cal" or "biological" survival of a g r 0 ~ p . l ~ ~  
Exec. Rep. 2,99th Cong., 1st sess. 27 (1985). The same language also appears in the U.S.'s 
implementing legislation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1091(a) (1994). 
145. Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at art. 2(a). 
146. Id. at art. 2(d). 
147. New Zealand's delegate to the Sixth Committee raked this point when he asked 
whether, in the absence of a motive requirement, a military bombing campaign could be 
genocidal. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
148. Akayesu Judgment, supra note 21, at para. 500. 
149. See KC Report, supra note 14, at 91. As regards Article II(b), the ILC specifies 
that mental harm must involve "some type of impairment of mental facultiesn and that 
"[tlhe bodily harm or the mental harm inflicted on members of a group must be of such a 
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Once again, one might question whether such narrowing is neces- 
sary in cases where a specific intent is evident. Thus, for example, a mili- 
tary commander who chose othenvise legal bombing targets with a spe- 
cific intent to destroy a group residing in the targeted areas should 
arguably be subject to genocidal liability despite the fact that the relevant 
killings may not constitute murder. To the extent that liability is based 
on knowledge of consequences, however, it makes sense to require that 
genocide involve an independent criminal wrongdoing that is merely en- 
hanced by the existence of genocidal intent. 
B. The Place of Genocide Within International Criminal Law 
A second objection allows that the proposed interpretation is inter- 
nally coherent, but contends that it so expands the definition of genocide 
as to erode its special place within the hierarchy of international criminal 
norms. In particular, this objection points to the overlap between the 
proposed interpretation and the separate category of "crimes against hu- 
manity," defined most recently in the Rome Statute as any one of a variety 
of acts "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack."150 To this 
serious nature as to threaten its destruction in whole or in part" Id. With regard to Article 
II(d), the ILC writes that "imposing measures intended to prevent births within the groupn 
indicates "the necessity of an element of coercion. Therefore this provision would not 
apply to voluntary birth control programmes sponsored by a State as matter of social 
policy." Id. at 92. As noted above, the AKajesu judgment found that rape could qualify 
under this category. See supra note 109. 
The ILC's concern about voluntary b i d  control programs responds in part to claims 
in the 1960s that US.-sponsored programs exhibited a genocidal relationship to African 
Americans. See LeBlanc, supra note 13, at 112-13; Robert Weisbord, Genocide? Birth 
Control and the Black American (1975). 
150. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 7. The Statute lists the following acts as 




(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law; 
( f )  Torture; 
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; 
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or 
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or 
- - -  
any crime within the jurisdiction of the- Court; 
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons; 
(j) The crime of apartheid; 
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. 
See id. 
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end, it argues that a specific intent interpretation is necessary to pre- 
served genocide as a distinct and special crime. 
As regards the formal distinction between genocide and crimes 
against humanity, it bears observing that any similarities between the avo 
crimes are hardly coincidental. As the ILC has observed, the concept of 
genocide grew in part out of the Nuremberg Charter's definition of the 
crime against humanity of "persecutions on political, religious, or racial 
grounds."151 Accordingly, commentators typically view genocide as a spe- 
cial type of crime against humanity rather than as an entirely distinct 
crime.152 And particularly now that the definition of crimes against hu- 
manity is understood to extend to acts committed during peacetime or in 
connection with purely internal conflicts,153 it is virtually certain that any 
act of genocide will also constitute a crime against humanity, no matter 
how one construes genocide's mens rea requirements. 
But despite inevitable similarities, it is equally clear that genocide is a 
special crime. As the ICTR noted in its Akayesu judgment, genocide and 
crimes against humanity "have different elements, and, moreover, are in- 
tended to protect different interests. The crime of genocide exists to pro- 
tect certain groups from extermination or attempted extermination. The 
concept of crimes against humanity exists to protect civilian populations 
from persecution."15* It is the threat to group survival, then, that distin- 
guishes genocidal liability and that, under the terms of the Genocide 
Convention, imposes upon a states a positive legal obligation to under- 
take preventative and punitive measures.155 This distinction remains 
under the proposed interpretation, which advances the interests of the 
prohibition against genocide by proscribing targeted actions that 
151. L C  Report, supra note 14, at 86; Nuremberg Charter, supra note 11, at art. 6(c). 
152. See, e.g., Kofi Annan, Address at the Occasion of the Signing of the Rome 
Statute &ttp://~k~v.un.org/ico (stating that genocide is a crime-agaiist humanity); 
Kayishema Judgment, supra note 21, at para. 39 (1999) ("The crime of genocide is a type 
of crime against humanity."). 
153. The category of crimes against humanity ~vas first introduced in the Nuremberg 
Charter. As discussed above, the Charter restricted its jurisdiction to crimes committed in 
connection with the Second World War, thus suggesting that a "~var nexus" ~vas central to 
the definition of the crime. See supra note 11 and accompanying text In addition, the 
ICIYStatute asserts the existence of an m e d  conflict as ajurisdictional requirement See 
ICIY Statute, supra note 19, art 5. However, in the tadit Judgment, supra note 27, at para. 
627. the deciding Trial Chamber stated that the Statute had "defined the crime in Article 5 
" 
more narrowly than necessary under customary international law." For a recent survey of 
the evolution of crimes against humanity as it pertains to the ~var nexus, see Beth Van 
Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 787 (1999). 
154. See Akayesu Judgment, supra note 21, at para 469. 
155. This obligation may also exist as a peremptory norm, independent of any 
- .  
conventional oblig&on. see supra note 14 &d accompanying text - o n e  argument 
dictates that the existence of genocide provides a legal basis for international military 
intervention. See Lori Lyman Bruun, Comment, Beyond the 1948 Convention: Emerging 
Principles of Genocide in Customary International Law, 17 Md. J. Int'l L. & Trade 193, 
211-18 (1993). 
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threaten the survival of at least a substantial part of specified groups. The 
requirements of crimes against humanity, on the other hand, are much 
looser, requiring only the existence of a widespread or systematic attack 
on any civilian population.156 Thus, an attack that is systematic but not 
widespread is sufficient to trigger liability. In addition, the only connec- 
tion required between the perpetrator's crimes and this jurisdictional ele- 
ment is that the perpetrator know those crimes are part of the attack. 
There is no requirement that the perpetrator have any knowledge regard- 
ing the consequences of his acts for the collective survival of any particu- 
lar group. As such, in most circumstances crimes against humanity will 
not rise to the level of the proposed model of genocide. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1950, the French Prosecutor Champetier de Ribes declared that 
the Nazis' crimes "were so monstrous, so undreamt of in history through- 
out the Christian era up to the birth of Hitlerism, that the term 'gene 
cide' has had to be coined to define it."15' Undeniably, the word "gene 
cide" carries with it a symbolic and cultural resonance. Its definition is as 
much about questions of history and collective memory as it is about as- 
signing individual criminal responsibility. The drafters of the Genocide 
Convention did not merely codify a crime; they codified a discourse for 
cataloguing human evil. 
The interpretation of genocidal intent faces obstacles as a principled 
means of determining individual liability where mass atrocities are at 
stake. When faithfully applied, its stringency invites obfuscation by de- 
fendants, allowing them to escape genocidal liability through their ma- 
nipulation of ideology and hierarchy. As an alternative interpretation of 
genocidal intent, the proposed standard of genocidal knowledge is worth 
considering. It finds support in the history of criminal law and, however 
indecisively, in the preparatory works of the Genocide Convention. It 
serves the Convention's purpose of protecting groups while simultane- 
ously retaining for genocide a distinct identity within the canon of inter- 
national criminal law. 
The creation of the ICC augurs a new era of international criminal 
enforcement. It also offers a crucial opportunity to resolve interpretive 
questions concerning the substantive definitions of international crimes. 
If the prohibition against genocide is to become an effective and princi- 
pled tool for assigning criminal liability, a reconsideration of genocidal 
intent is necessary. 
156. See Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 7. In this respect the ICC Statute 
upholds the jurisprudence of the ICIY. See TadiC Judgment, supra note 27, at para. 646. 
157. XIX Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 
531 (1948). 
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